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1. Introduction 
Since Keynes first argued that backwardation was the normal It is now over sixty years since Keynes (1930) first argued 
state of af fairs on futures markets, there have been several 
theoretical explanations for its existence. In particular, Fort and 
Quirk have shown that the "Houthakker effect" can lead to a 
backwardation equilibrium. In this paper, we consider another 
argument for backwardation suggested by Houthakker, namely, asymmetric 
arbitrage. Our conclusions are generally negative, despite its 
intuitive appeal. Specifically, in a world with an equal number of 
short and long hedgers, with identical utility functions and densities 
over cash and futures prices, if the futures market is a forward 
market, then in a rational expectations framework, asymmetric 
arbitrage has no ef fect on the pattern of futures (or cash) prices. 
If we are dealing with a true futures market, under the above 
assumptions, arbitrage will act to encourage short hedging and to 
discourage long hedging only under some restrictive conditions. 
Moreover, further quantitative restrictions must be imposed in order 
to derive a backwardation equilibrium under asymmetric arbitrage. 
that the "normal" state of af fairs on futures markets was one of 
backwardation, here interpreted as a situation in which the current 
price of a futures contract is less than its expected price at 
maturity of the futures contract. Keynes argued that short hedgers 
(long in the cash market, short in the futures market) would pay a 
risk premium to speculators, this premium representing the degree of 
backwardation in the market. Keynes did not explain why it was that 
only short hedgers, and not both short and long hedgers, would have to 
pay such a premium. (Long hedgers are long in the futures market and 
short in the cash market). Later, Hicks (1965) argued that a 
preponderance of short over long hedgers was to be expected because 
purchasers of inputs have more possibilities of substitution available 
to them than do the producers of a commodity. Kaldor (1939) admitted 
the possibility of an excess of long over short hedging on the market, 
in part because of the quantity risks that a producer exposes himself 
to if he engages in a hedge to avoid price risks. In the more recent 
literature, backwardation and the preponderance of short over long 
hedging has been attributed to information asymmetries (Danthine 
(1978)), to a highly elastic demand for the final good (Macminn, 
*This research was supported in part under NSF Grant #SES-8319960. 
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Morgan and Smith (1984)) or to the fact that futures contracts provide 
poor consumption hedges (Richard and Sundaresan (1981)), and sometimes 
backwardation is simply imposed ad hoc as a condition of the model 
describing the futures market (Baesel and Grant (1982)). 
In this paper, we explore an explanation for backwardation 
advanced by Houthakker (1959), namely the idea that arbitrage on the 
futures market is asymmetric in such a way as to favor short hedgers 
over long hedgers. The idea here is that at any point in time, the 
futures price cannot exceed the cash price plus carrying costs to the 
maturity date of the futures contract, since otherwise there is a 
riskless profit to be earned by selling a futures contract, buying 
cash and storing to deliver on the futures. Arbitrage thus provides 
an upper limit on the amount by which the futures price can exceed the 
cash price, but there is no corresponding arbitrage operation 
available to limit the amount by which the cash price can exceed the 
futures price. 
Actually, Houthakker suggested two explanations for 
backwardation in his seminal work of the 1950s and 1960s, the second 
being the tendency for the delivery options admissible under a futures 
contract to be better substitutes for one another at low than at high 
cash prices. In a recent paper, Fort and Quirk (1984) show that under 
an appropriate speci fication of such a "Houthakker effect," a 
backwardation equilibrium can be constructed, even when there is an 
equal number of short and long hedgers on the market, with identical 
utility functions and densities over cash and futures prices. 
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Briefly, our results in the present paper are the following. 
In a world with an equal number of short and long hedgers, with 
identical utility functions and densities over cash and futures 
prices, then asymmetric arbitrage has no ef fect on the pattern of cash 
and futures prices when the futures market is in fact a forward 
market, that is, a market in which the cash and futures prices are 
identically equal at maturity of the futures contract. In such a 
world, under rational expectations, the resulting equilibrium is a 
martingale equilibrium in the futures market (current price of the 
futures contract equals its expected price next period), with the 
current futures price equal to the current cash price plus carrying 
costs to maturity of the futures contract. 
The situation is dif ferent in a true futures market, that is, 
a market in which there are two or more delivery options admissible 
under the futures contract, the options being less than perfect 
substitutes for one another. 
In a true futures market, the ef fect of asymmetric arbitrage 
on a previous martingale equilibrium is indeterminate in the general 
case; it might be to produce a backwardation equilibrium, or a 
contango, or no change at all. Given an arbitrary symmetric joint 
density over the cash and futures prices and given an arbitrary 
concave utility function for traders. the introduction of asymmetric 
arbitrage does not even necessarily encourage short hedging and 
discourage long hedging, despite the intuitive appeal of Houthakker's 
argument. For one very special case, that of a uniform density with 
the utility function satisfying constant or decreasing absolute risk 
aversion, we show that Houthakker's conjecture concerning the effect 
of aymmetric arbitrage on hedging patterns holds, so long as cash and 
futures commitments are technical complements for one another. But 
even in this special case, additional restrictions need to be imposed 
to guarantee a backwardation equilibrium. Moreover, imposing a 
rational expectations framework on the model of the futures market 
implies that given a T-period futures contract, the effects of 
asymmetric arbitrage show up only in the futures markets for periods 
T-1 and T while in earlier periods, the futures market behaves like a 
forward market. In effect, rational expectations, by precluding the 
possibility of capital gains by traders in earlier periods, rules out 
speculation as a market force during those periods. 
The upshot of all this is that, despite its intuitive appeal, 
Houthakker's argument for backwardation based on asymmetry of 
arbitrage has no standing when the market is a forward market, and is 
at best highly conjectural when applied to a true futures market. 
2. The Model 
4 
We consider a world in which there is a futures market as well 
as cash markets in the commodity options deliverable under the futures 
contract. This is a T period (t = 0,1,2, . . .  ,T) world. There is one 
futures contract available, maturing at time T. Traders on the 
futures market are long (L) hedgers, short (S) hedgers, and 
speculators. All traders are assumed to have the same strictly 
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concave utility function over income, and the same probability beliefs 
concerning futures and cash prices for periods in the future. 
Let p� denote the cash price at time t of a commodity option 
deliverable under the futures contract. Let p� denote the price of 
the futures contract at time t. W� and W� are the cash commitments at 
time t of each short and long hedger, and V�. V� are their futures 
commitments at time t. n� . n� denote the profits of short and long 
hedgers over the period beginning at time t-1 and ending at time t, 
given by 
s nt 
c c s f f _ _s s • (pt - Pt-l)Wt-1 + (pt-1 - Pt > vt-1 - kt-l(Wt-1) + nt 
L ( c c) L f f ) L L ) 
* 
nt = Pt-1 - Pt Wt-1 +(pt 
- Pt-1 Vt-1 + kt-l(Wt-1 + nt 
In these expressions, short hedgers are viewed as elevator 
(1) 
operators and long hedgers are viewed as millers. Thus short hedgers 
buy cash wheat to store it, and sell futures contracts to hedge their 
cash commitments. Long hedgers are assumed to undertake commitments 
to deliver flour in the future at a wheat-equivalent price equal to 
the current cash price plus carrying costs. They buy the cash wheat 
required for milling at the time that flour is to be delivered, 
hedging these projected wheat purchases by current purchases of 
futures. Both long and short hedgers are assumed to terminate their 
cash and futures positions at time t, the end of the period. kt_1c·
> 
is a strictly concave function representing the "carrying costs" 
associated with cash commitments, including convenience yield as well 
as interest, warehousing. insurance and the like, associated with 
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carrying a unit of the commodity during the tth period. For symmetry, 
the kt_1(') function is assumed to be the same for both short and long 
• 
hedgers. nt is profits from activities not directly related to the 
cash and futures commitments, and again for symmetry is assumed to be 
the same for both short and long hedgers. 
Eus 
The objective functions for the hedgers are then given by 
T t S [ Ii Eu(nt) t=l 
T 
EuL = [ litEu(n�) 
1:=1 
where Ii is a discount factor. 
(2) 
The timing of decisions is the following. At time t = 0, p� 
and p� are known and the cash and futures commitments W�. W�. V�. V� 
are undertaken. At time t = 1, the cash and futures markets reopen 
f c S L S L and p1,p1 are known at the time that w1. w1• v1, v1 are undertaken. 
The process continues for t = 2, • . • ,T - 1. Finally, at time t = T, 
the horizon ends with the futures contract maturing and with the cash 
and futures market again open. 
It is assumed that the commodity in question is a seasonal 
good. Time t = 0 can be thought of as the harvest time, with no 
harvest occurring again until after time t T. Thus all of the 
commodity available for use at time t = 1 to t = T is represented by 
the cash commitments of short hedgers (elevator operators) at time 
t = 0. Similarly, it is assumed that all of the commitments for 
consumption at t = 1 to t = T are represented by the cash commitments 
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of long hedgers (millers) at time t = 0. Assuming an equal number of 
identical short and long hedgers, we have the following market 
clearing conditions. 
Cash Markets: 
WS t 
L 
wt. t 
Futures Markets: 
0, 1, . . .. T - 1 
VS = vL + Vspec,t = 0,1, • . •  ,T - 1 t t t 
(3) 
( 4) 
where V�pec,t = 0,1,2, • . • •  T - 1 is the amount of purchases of futures 
contracts by pure speculators. Speculators buy futures whenever 
expected profits from purchases are positive (Epf > pf_1l and sell 
futures whenever expected profits from sales are positive 
(Epf < P{_1). We assume that the aggregate (excess) demand functions 
for futures by speculators are of less than infinite elasticity. 
In describing the pattern of prices on the futures market, we 
use the following terminology. The futures market attains a 
martingale equilibrium at time t - 1 if the market clearing prices 
P{_1.p{ satisfy the condition: 
fl f f E(pt Pt-1) = Pt-1' (5) 
The futures market is said to exhibit backwardation at time t - l, if 
fl f f E(pt Pt-1) > Pt-1' 
Similarly, the futures market exhibits a contango at time 
t - 1 if 
(6) 
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f f f E(pt
l pt-1) < Pt-1" ( 7) 
In analyzing the effect of asymmetric arbitrage on the pattern 
of prices on the futures market, it is helpful to distinguish between 
two cases, the case of a forward market, and the case of a "true" 
futures market. A forward market is one where there is only one 
option deliverable under the futures contract, so that p� = pi is 
known to be the relationship that will hold at time T between the 
market clearing prices on the cash and futures markets. This is the 
case where "perfect hedges " occur, and is the case typically studied 
in the theoretical literature dealing with futures markets (e. g. , see 
Anderson and Danthine (1983)). In contrast, if two or more options 
are deliverable under a futures contract, with the options being less 
than perfect substitutes for one another, then we have the case of a 
"true" futures market. 
Because choice of the option to deliver under the futures 
contract is up to the seller, buyers and sellers in a true futures 
market know that what will be delivered under the futures contract 
will be that option with the lowest cash price at time T. Hence 
arbitrage ensures that the relationship between equilibrium prices of 
the futures and any delivery option at time t = T in a true futures 
market takes the less restrictive form p� { p� ; hedges now become 
"imperfect" and there is a nondegenerate joint pdf over pi,p� that 
must be analyzed in examining the time pattern of cash and futures 
prices. 
Moreover, at any time t < T, arbitrage imposes additional 
constraints on the futures or forward price, through the relationship 
f 
T-1 , , 
pt i Pt
c + � k , where k is the marginal cost of carrying a unit of 
�=t 
� � 
the commodity over the <� + l)st period. If this constraint were 
violated, then there would be a riskless profit that could be earned 
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by selling a futures, buying a delivery option on the cash market, and 
then holding this option to deliver at time T under the futures 
contract. Because arbitrage acts only to impose an upper (but not a 
lower) bound on p� , arbitrage is asymmetric. We first investigate the 
ef fect of asymmetric arbitrage on a forward market. 
3. Price Patterns in a Forward Market 
Since p� = pi is the equilibrium condition at time T in a 
forward market, thus at t = T - 1, cash and futures commitments of 
short and long hedgers are chosen under the degenerate joint density 
f(p�)(e f(pi> > . held in common by all traders. First order conditions 
for a short hedger are given by 
f"' , s> C c c • < s > 1 < cl c 
Ou (nT PT - PT-1 - kT-1 WT-1 f PT dpT 
f"' ' ( s f c c c Ou nT)[pT-1 - pT]f(pT)dpT = O 
0 
Similarly, first order conditions for the long hedger are given by 
f "' L c ' L c c c 
ou ' (nT)[pT-1 + kT-l(WT-1) - pT]f(pT)dpT = 
O 
f"' ' ( L c f l c c Ou nT)[pT - PT-1 f(pT)dpT 0 
(8) 
( 9) 
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Consider as a possible candidate for equilibrium in the 
t = T - 1 cash and futures market the following price and commitment 
pattern: 
f c ' S L __ q __ L 
PT-1 = PT-1 + kT-l(WT-1), where WT-1 = WT-1 = WT-l'VT-1 = "T-1 = WT-1' 
fl f > f < cl c > c 
• 
and with E(pT PT-1 = PT-1' E PT PT-1 = PT-1 + kT-l(WT-1). 
Here k;_1<WT_1> represents the marginal carrying cost of carrying a 
unit of inventory from time t = T - 1 to time t = T. 
Note that combining the two first order conditions in (8) and 
(9) we have 
f c , s 
[pT-1 - PT-1 - kT-l(WT-1)) 
f c I L 
[pT-1 - PT-1 - kT-l(WT-1)) 
0 .  
o. 
Since kT-l is strictly concave, we have wi_1 = wi_1 = WT-l' which 
satisfies the cash market equilibrium condition in (3). 
Further, integrate the first integral in (8) by parts to 
obtain 
c 
s rPT c , s I"" u ' (rrT> Jo [x-pT-1-kT-l(WT-l)]f(x)dx 0 
c 
S __ q f"" ,, S f PT c ' S c _ -(WT-1-vT-1) Ou (rrT) O [x-pT-1-kT-l(WT-l)]f(x)dxdpT - O 
(10) 
cl c c ' Given that E(pT pT_1> = PT-l + kT_1<wr_1), strict concavity of 
u implies that wi-l = vi_1. A similar development establishes that 
wi_1 = vi_1 . Hence we satisfy the market clearing condition 
S L VT-l = VT-l for the futures market. 
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Consider next equilibrium in the time t = T - 2 market. 
Suppose it is common knowledge at t = T - 2 that all traders have 
identical utility functions and identical probability beliefs about 
time t = T - 1 and time t = T cash and futures prices. Then we claim 
that a rational expectations equilibrium at time t = T - 2 is one such 
f c , , f f  f that PT-2 = PT-2 + kT-2(WT-2) + kT-l(WT-1), with E(pT-l
lpT-2) = PT-2 
c 
I 
c c I s L and E(pT-l pT_2) = pT_2 + kT_2(WT_2). Here WT_2 = WT_2 = WT_2 such 
' S ' L S L that �-2(WT-2) = kT-2(WT-2), and VT-2 = VT-2 = WT-2" 
The argument is much like the one above establishing the 
martingale property in the time t = T - 1 markets. Given the common 
knowledge assumption, each trader knows that the equilibrium price 
pattern in the time t = T - 1 markets is one such that 
f C I 
PT-1 = PT-1 + kT-l(WT-1). 
f Since PT-1 
c , 
PT-1 + kT-l(WT-1), again we 
can describe the probability beliefs of traders in terms of a 
degenerate density over p�-l only, say g(p�_1>.  
First order conditions for the short hedger are then given by 
fa> , s c c , _ _s c c -
Ou (rrT-l)[pT-1 - PT-2 - kT-2(WT-2)]g(pT-l)dpT-1 O 
fa> , s )[ f c , ( s )] c ) c Ou (rrT-1 PT-2 - PT-1 - kT-1 WT-1 g(pT-1 dpT-1 
The long hedger's first order conditions are 
f"" , L c I L c c c 
Ou (rrT-l)[pT-2 + kT-2<wr-2 > - PT-l]g(pT-l)dpT-1 
0 
0 
f "" L c I L f c c 
ou'(rrT-l)[pT-1 + kT-l(WT-1) - PT-2]g(pT-l)dpT-1 = O 
(11) 
(12) 
Using the earlier approach, it immediately follows from (11) 
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S L and (12) that if WT_2 = WT_2 
I s I L 
WT_2 such that kT_2CWT_2) = kT_2CWT_2), 
then market clearing prices in the t = T - 2 markets satisfy 
f C I I f f 
PT-2 = PT-2 + kT-2(WT-2) + kT-l(WT-1) with E(pT-l l
pT-2) 
C C C I E(pT-l l pT-2) = PT-2 + kT-2(WT-2)
. 
Similarly, the above arguments applied to 
f 
PT-2' 
t = T - 3, T - 4 • • • •  ,0. Thus we have established the following. 
Proposition 1. Given a forward market with an equal number of short 
and long hedgers, each with identical utility functions and densities 
over cash and futures prices, there exists a rational expectations 
equilibrium which is also a martingale equilibrium, satisfying 
f T-1 I 
Pt = P� + [ k (W ) , t i:=t 't 't 0,1, • . •  ,T - 1, 
P
f 
= p
c with T T 
E( 
f I f Pt Pt-1) 
f 
Pt-1' t = 1, • . •  , T 
c c c ' E(pt l pt-1) = pt-1 + kt(Wt)' t 
S L S __ L wt = wt = wt. vt = v;: = wt, t 
1,2, . • •  ,T 
0,1, • • •  ,T - 1. 
One thing to note about this rational expectations martingale 
equilibrium is that there is no role for Houthakker 's "asymmetric 
arbitrage" to play in influencing the configuration of equilibrium 
prices, or the decisions taken by short or long hedgers. In fact, 
with a forward market, the futures prices at all times t = 0,1,2, ... ,T 
are set at the maximum levels permitted by arbitrage (futures price 
equals the cash price plus marginal carrying cost). 
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4. Price Patterns on a True Futures Market 
The situation is quite different once we move to a true 
futures market, with two or more delivery options available under the 
futures contract. In a true futures market, asymmetric arbitrage can 
impose a binding constraint on the joint pdf over the cash and futures 
prices, and hence can have an impact on the decisions of hedgers 
concerning their cash and futures commitments, which in turn has an 
effect on the pattern of the market clearing prices in the cash and 
futures markets. 
Recall that in a true futures market, arbitrage ensures that 
f c f c T-l I 
PT i PT' and Pt i Pt + [ ki;' t = 0,1, • • • ,T - 1, but there are no i;=t 
corresponding constraints limiting the amount by which the cash price 
can exceed the futures price at any point in time. 
Consider now a futures market in which arbitrage is not 
permitted to occur. Let h(p�,p�) denote the joint density over the 
cash and futures prices at time t in such a situation, held by all 
traders at time t - 1. Our approach is to first construct an 
equilibrium for the case where arbitrage is not permitted to occur, 
and then to contrast the resulting pattern of market clearing prices 
with that which obtains under arbitrage. 
Because we wish to explore the effects of asymmetric arbitrage 
under as simple conditions as possible, it is convenient to begin with 
a set of assumptions under which the equilibrium (without arbitrage) 
is a martingale equilibrium. In particular, assume that the density 
held by traders at t = T - 1 is symmetric about Ep�,Ep�. and consider 
as a candidate for equilibrium in the T - 1 markets the price and 
commitment relationships: 
f c , 
PT-1 = PT-1 + kT-l(WT-1). 
fl f f cl c E(pT PT-1) = PT-1' E(pT PT-1) 
c , 
PT-1 + kT-l(WT-1) 
s L , s I L with WT-l = WT-l = WT-l satisfying kT-l(WT-l) = kT_1<WT_1l, 
and with v
S 
T-1 
L 
VT-1 
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At t = T - 1 the first order conditions for the short hedger 
are 
s 
aEhu 
s awT-1 
s 
aEhu 
a�-1 
�J�u'(ni)[p� - P�-1 , s c f c f kT-l(WT-l)]h(pT,pT)dpTdpT 
- f "'f"' , s f f c f c f - 0 Ou (nT)[pT-1 - pT]h(pT,pT)dpTdpT 0 
0 
(13) 
Similarly, the first order conditions for the long hedger are 
L 
aEhu 
L awT-1 
L 
aEhu 
L avT-1 
J"'f"' L e  ' L  O ou'(nT)[pT-1 + kT-l(WT-1) C) C f f C PT h(pT,pT)dpTdpT 
f "'f"' L f f c f f c 0 ou'(nT)[pT - PT-l]h(pT,pT)dpTdpT 0 
Suppose that wi-l = wi-l = WT-l satisfies 
0 
' S ' L S L kT-l(WT-l) = kT-l(WT-l) and assume that VT-l = VT-l = VT-l" Let 
c c f f c f x =PT - EpT, y = PT - EpT. Then by symmetry, h(EpT + x, EpT + y) 
c f h(EpT - x,EpT - y) for all x, y .  We also have 
S * L nT(x,y) = WT-lx - VT-ly + nT = nT(-x, -y). 
( 14) 
Rewriting the first order conditions (13) and (14), we have 
s 
aEhu 
= s 
awT-1 
J°' c.f' fu'(ni(x,y))xh(Ep� + x, Ep� + y)dydx -EpT -EpT 
0 
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L 
aEhu 
L awT-1 
- J°' 
c
f°' 
f
u'(ni(x,y))xh(Ep� + x,Ep� + y)dydx 0 (15) 
s 
aEhu 
a�-1 
L 
aEhu 
L avT-1 
-EpT -EpT 
Sm J"' S c fu'(nT(x, y))yh(. , . )dydx -EpT -EpT 
0 
= - J°' cf°' fu'(n�(x,y))yh(.,. )dydx = o -EpT -EpT 
Clearly, by substituting (-x, -y) for (x,y) in the second and 
fourth equations, these reduce to the first and third. Hence market 
clearing in both the cash and futures markets is consistent with the 
first order conditions in the t = T - 1 markets. 
We might note that in contrast to the t = T - 1 equilibrium in 
the case of a forward market, here there is no guarantee that all cash 
commitments will be hedged; all we know is that vi_1 = vi_1• 
Consider now the t = T - 2 markets. Again invoking a common 
knowledge assumption, all traders know that the equilibrium pattern of 
f c , 
prices on the t = T - 1 markets will satisfy PT-l = PT-l + kT_1<WT_1>. 
Using the line of reasoning employed earlier, we can show that a 
rational expectations equilibrium exists on the t = T - 2 markets such 
f c ,  , f f  f that PT-2 = PT-2 + kT-2(WT-2) + kT-l(WT-1) with E(pT-l
l
pT-2) = PT-2' 
c I c c • . s L and E(pT-1 PT-2) = PT-2 + kT-2(WT-2)' with WT-2 = WT-2 = WT-2 
. . ' S ' L S L satisfying kT_2(WT_2l = kT_2CWT_2>. and with VT_2 = VT_2 = WT_2. Note 
that we do not require symmetry of the density over time t = T - 1 
prices, since the rational expectations assumption reduces the 
t = T - 1 market to a forward market. Similarly, the same argument 
applies to t =  T - 3,T - 4 • • . •  ,0. We formalize this as follows. 
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Proposition 2. Given an equal number of short and long hedgers, each 
with identical utility functions and density functions over futures 
and cash prices, and with the density over t = T prices symmetric 
about the mean cash and futures prices, there exists a rational 
expectations equilibrium which is also a martingale equilibrium, 
satisfying 
f pt 
T-1 
p� + [ <· 
i: =t 
t 0,1,2, ... ,T - 1. 
fl f ) E(pt Pt-1 
cl c ) E(pt Pt-1 
f pt-1' t = 1,
2,. . .,T 
c , pt-1 + kt-1' t = 1,
2,. .. ,T. 
We next examine the effects of asymmetric arbitrage on the 
cash and futures commitments of traders. A natural way to incorporate 
asymmetric arbitrage into the picture is to assume that if h(p�,pf > is 
the density when arbitrage is not permitted, and f(p�,pf > is the 
density when arbitrage can occur, then 
c f
) f(pt,pt 
where i.Ht) 
h(p�.p�) for p� < p� + d(t) 
r c f f f h(pt,pt)dpt for pt p�+d(t) 
p� + d(t) 
0 for f c Pt > Pt + d(t) 
T-1 
L:<· i:=t 
(16) 
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Thus the effect of arbitrage is to concentrate at 
(p�.p� + d(t)) all the probability weight assigned under h to (p�.pf> 
for higher values of pf. Given this specification of f, it 
immediately follows that h stochastically dominates f in the sense of 
first degree stochastic dominance (see Quirk and Saposnik (1963)), 
since. for any p�. we have 
f f 
JPt c 
0 h(pt,v)dv i 
rPt c Jo f(pt,v)dv 
for all pf. with strict inequality for some values of pf. By the well 
known property of dominating distributions, Ehu > Efu if u is monotone 
increasing in pf. and Ehu < Efu if u is monotone decreasing in pf . 
Hence we have the following. 
Proposition 3. Arbitrage acts to increase expected utility for short 
hedgers, and to decrease expected utility for long hedgers. 
Proof: For every W,V, Ehu(n
s
(W,V)) < Efu(n
s
(W,V)) since n
s is 
monotone decreasing in pf while u is monotone increasing in n5. 
• • 
W ,V maximize 
s • • Ehu(n (W , V )) 
s •• •• s Ehu(n) and let W ,V maximize Efu(n ). Then 
s • • s •• •• < Efu(n (W ,V )) � Efu(n (W ,V )). A similar 
argument establishes the proposition for long hedgers. 
Let 
When arbitrage is permitted, the first order conditions for 
short hedgers are given by 
s 
aEfu 
s awT-1
s 
aE fu 
avi-1 
c fmr1'T , S c c ' __ q c f f c= oJo u (nT)[pT - PT-1 - kT-1<wr-1>Jf(pT,pT)dpTdpT 
c 
foJoTu • (n�Hpf f c f f c PT-l]f(pT,pT)dpTdpT 0
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0 
(17) 
- s - s Let WT-l' VT-l denote the optimal choices of the short hedger
-s -s under arbitrage, satisfying (17), and let WT-l'VT-l denote the choices
of the short hedger when arbitrage is not permitted, satisfying (13). 
Evaluate the first order conditions in (17) at W�_1,vi_1 and consider
S S S 
aE us -s -s aEhu aEfu aEhu - _f_ , evaluated at WT-1' VT-1'
-- - -- , s s awi-1 aw�-1 avT-1 avT-1 
Then we have 
s 
aEhu 
s awT-1
s 
aEfu 
s awT-1 
= Jmc c _ c _ ' jm , S , 0 c f f c 
0 PT PT-1 kT_l(WT-1)){ c[u (nT) 
- u (n )]h(pT,pT)dpT}dpT 
s 
aEhu 
avi-1 
s aEfu -
a�-1 
PT 
_ jmjm [ f - 0 c PT-1 p�][u' (n�) 0 c f f c u'(n )]h(pT,pT)dpTdpT 
PT 
0 s f c . s where n = nT evaluated at pT = PT' with WT-l 
-s s 7"-'> 
WT-l' VT-1 = VT-1 ' 
(18) 
(19) 
In order to show that arbitrage encourages short hedging, in 
effect we need to solve a comparative statics problem where the 
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exogenous shift involves the change from the density h to the density 
f. In turn, to solve the comparative statics problem for an arbitrary
density h and an arbitrary concave utility function, the signs of (18) 
and (19) should be determinate. Using integration by parts, it is 
straightforward to establish that if the utility function satisfies 
constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion, then (19) is negative 
for an arbitrary symmetric density h. 
Thus we can write (19) as 
f fm , S , 0 1 rPT f C Im 0{[u (nT) - u (n ) Jo (pT-l - x)h(pT,x)dx c
PT
f 
�c(�T<Pf_1 - x)h(p�,x)dx)[u''(n�) - u''(n°)J(- vi_1)dp�)dp�.
PT 
s Since nT n° when pf = p�. the first term under the integral 
is zero. With the utility function exhibiting constant or decreasing 
absolute risk aversion, u''' > 0, and the second term is negative, so 
that (19) is negative for an arbitrary symmetric h .  
However, the sign of (18) depends on obscure properties of the 
utility function and the density in the general case . Hence, despite 
the intuitive appeal of the asymmetric arbitrage argument, it turns 
out that in the general case, we cannot even show that the presence of 
arbitrage encourages short hedging (and discourages long hedging), 
much less that arbitrage leads to a backwardation equilibrium . 
Turning to a highly special case, assume h is uniformly 
distributed and that u is characterized by constant or decreasing 
absolute risk aversion. Then the term in curved bracket of eq . (18) 
will be positive and decreasing in p�. s s aEhu aEfu is -- - s Hence _ _s aw -1 awT-l T 
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-s :-_s s 0 negative, evaluated at WT-l'VT-l " Similarly, since u'(nT) - u'(n )  is 
s s 
f aEhu aEfu increasing in pT and h is uniformly distributed, -- - -- is 
-s -s negative, evaluated at WT-l' VT-l"
a�-1 a�-1 
At a regular maximum (a stable equilibrium), and assuming that 
a2EuS w and v are technical complements ( awav > 0). it follows that 
- s -s - s :-_R WT-l > WT-l and VT-l > yt_1, as shown in Figure 1. 
In Figure 1, the solid lines identify the (W,V) combinations 
s s 
that set � = O and � aw�_1 a�_1 
O given the density h, while the dashed 
lines identify the combinations that set these expressions equal to 
zero, given the density f. As indicated, the introduction of 
arbitrage into a situation in which h is uniform shifts these curves 
so as to produce an increase in both the cash and futures commitments 
of short hedgers, given the prices p�_1, p�-l such that 
f c • fl f f cl c c • PT-1 = PT-1 + kT-1' E(pT PT-1) 
= PT-1' E(pT PT-1) = PT-1 + kT-1° A 
similar argument establishes that the cash and futures commitments of 
long hedgers are both reduced by the introduction of arbitrage in this 
situation. 
It follows from this that looking at hedging activities only, 
introducing asymmetric arbitrage leads to a situation in which there 
is an excess supply of futures contracts at the martingale 
equilibrium, and an excess demand for cash holdings of the commodity, 
s WT-1 
-s WT-1 
-,-S WT-1 
20a 
s ()Eh u = 0 I 
r 
+ 
s ClVm11 ClE 
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FIGURE 1. Effect of Arbitrage on Short Hedging Commitments 
(Uniform density h) 
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at t = T - 1. To clear markets, the futures price pf_1 falls and the 
cash price p�-l rises. 
Proposition 4 .  Given an equal number o f  short and long hedgers, all 
with identical utility functions and densities over cash and futures 
prices, assume (1) when arbitrage is prohibited, the density h(p�,pf> 
is uniform; (2) cash and futures commitments are technical complements 
for one another; ( 3) the utility function is characterized by constant 
or decreasing absolute risk aversion. Then the ef fect of introducing 
arbitrage is to lower the futures price at t = T - 1 and to raise the 
cash price at t = T - 1, both relative to the equilibrium prices when 
arbitrage is prohibited. 
Proposition 4 provides some highly restrictive sufficient 
conditions for the ef fect that Houthakker argued was due to arbitrage, 
with arbitrage encouraging short hedging and discouraging long 
hedging. Note, however, that even under the highly restrictive 
conditions of Proposition 4, there is no guarantee that the 
equilibrium when arbitrage is present is a backwardation equilibrium. 
The reason is that the introduction of arbitrage makes short hedging 
more attractive in part because it lowers the expected value of the 
futures price at time T, since the upper tail of the density h is 
lopped off by arbitrage. What is required for arbitrage to lead to 
backwardation is not simply that short hedging be encouraged and long 
hedging be discouraged; net short hedging must be encouraged enough so 
that the fall in the futures price at t = T - 1 more than compensates 
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for the fall in the expected value of the futures price at t = T. 
This requires restrictive quantitative conditions on the utility 
function and on the density, beyond the conditions specified in 
Proposition 4 .  It is clear that the presence of asymmetric arbitrage 
is at best a tenuous argument for a backwardation equilibrium. 
One other point should be made about the pattern of futures 
prices under asymmetric arbitrage, given the rational expectations 
framework. The common knowledge assumption that underlies rational 
expectations equilibria guarantees that the only ef fect that 
asymmetric arbitrage will have so far as backwardation (or a contango) 
is concerned is in the t = T - 1 market. The reason for this is that 
whatever is the relationship between the market clearing cash and 
futures prices on the t = T - 1 markets. this relationship will be 
inferred by all traders at a rational expectations equilibrium at 
t = T - 2. Similar arguments apply to t = T - 3,T - 4 • • . .  ,0. 
Backwardation (or a contango) can only occur in the t = T - 1 markets. 
This means that at a rational expectations equilibrium. the upper 
limit on the futures price imposed by arbitrage does not constrain the 
equilibrium in any period prior to T - 1, and the futures market is 
reduced to a simple forward market in all such prior periods. The 
futures price in such periods simply equals the cash price plus 
carrying costs to maturity of the futures contract, and there is no 
role for speculation to play, since the futures market attains a 
martingale equilibrium. This might be viewed as a rationalization of 
sorts for the widespread use of two period models in the literature on 
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futures markets, or, more correctly perhaps, an argument shedding some 
doubt as to the use of the rational expectations framework in 
analyzing a speculative market. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have explored the implications of asymmetric 
arbitrage on the pattern of prices on a futures market, and in 
particular we have looked into the question as to whether asymmetric 
arbitrage is a force making for backwardation. Our conclusions are 
generally negative. If the futures market is a forward market, then 
in a rational expectations framework, asymmetric arbitrage has no 
effect on the pattern of futures (or cash) prices. If we are dealing 
with a true futures market, then arbitrage will typically have some 
effect on the pattern of hedging and hence on the pattern of futures 
prices. However, there is no clear-cut conclusion that the 
introduction of arbitrage acts to encourage short hedging and to 
discourage long hedging; generally this depends on the specific 
properties of the joint density over cash and futures prices and on 
the specific properties of the utility function. Furthermore, even 
when it is known that short hedging increases and long hedging 
decreases because of the introduction of arbitrage, this does not 
imply that a martingale equilibrium becomes a backwardation 
equilibrium; this requires further quantitative restrictions. 
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